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I. Introduction
Once hailed as a novel and exciting land management concept,
transferable development rights1 have met with limited success. The
doctrine, which recognizes the severability of development potential
from land,2 has not generally met expectations. Beginning in 1977, sev-
eral South Florida counties and municipalities implemented TDR zon-
ing ordinances.3 These regulations' were enacted primarily to preserve
environmentally sensitive lands.5 However, only in Collier and Dade
Counties have sales of development rights been reported, and only in
Collier County have development rights actually been used. Therefore,
Florida planners who once recommended the TDR approach as a
method of preserving historic landmark sites, land in environmentally
sensitive regions, open space, and farmland now speak in more cautious
terms. This note will analyze some of the obstacles encountered in im-
1. Transferable development rights will be referred to throughout this note by
their common acronym, TDRs.
2. See generally J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT (1974) [hereinafter cited as SPACE
ADRIFT]; THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A NEW TECHNIQUE OF LAND USE
REGULATION (J. Rose ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as TDR]; Merriam, Making TDR
Work, 56 N.C.L. REv. 77 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Making TDR Work].
3. A zoning ordinance in which TDRs are granted to landowners in conjunction
with restrictive zoning placed on their properties is the usual mechanism for implemen-
tation of a TDR program.
4. Six South Florida regulations have been evaluated: Dade County, Fla., Ordi-
nance 81-122 (Jan. 1, 1982); Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance R-81-28-30 (Nov.
23, 1981); Collier County, Fla. Ordinance 82-2 § 9 (Jan. 5, 1982); Pinellas County,
Fla., Zoning Reg. § XXXIII-D(1)(d) (Dec. 16, 1980); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE
art. II, § 64.09 (1977); HOLLYWOOD, FLA., ZONING AND LAND DEv. CODE art. 32A
(1978).
5. The State of Florida has also employed the concept as a preservation tech-
nique but uses a different approach. Florida Statute § 193.501 provides a mechanism
whereby the owner of environmentally sensitive land may convey to the state or local
government the development right of that parcel or covenant with the government that
the "land shall not be used by the owner for any purpose other than outdoor recrea-
tional or park purposes." Fla. Stat. § 193.501 (1) (1981). In return, the state agrees to
reduce the tax assessment on that property. Fla. Stat. § 193.501 (3) (1981).
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plementation of TDR ordinances and will attempt to explain why
South Florida regulations have enjoyed only minimal acceptance.
II. Principles of Transferable Development Rights
Land may be viewed as an assemblage or bundle of rights.' Ac-
cording to TDR theory, the right to develop one's property may be sev-
ered from the land and sold, much in the same way as mineral rights
are severed and sold.7 But while mineral rights do not "leave" the land,
TDRs are separated from their land source and re-established on a des-
ignated recipient site. The usual vehicle for implementation of a TDR
program is a zoning ordinance. Such a regulation empowers the local
government entity which has responsibility for zoning to grant TDRs to
landowners, along with use restrictions placed on their properties. The
restrictions generally dictate that development on the transfer site be
kept to a marginal level.
Although several variations of the TDR scheme exist,8 four basic
steps are involved. First, land which the local government wishes to
preserve must be identified and placed in a restrictive zoning classifica-
tion. Second, a determination of the number of rights which will be
granted to owners in the preservation area must be made and assigned.,
Third, recipient sites to which development rights can be transferred
must be identified. Fourth, the actual sale and transfer of rights must
take place.10 Additional development is then precluded at the transfer
6. Rose, The Transfer of Development Rights: A Preview of an Evolving Con-
cept, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 330, 331 (1975).
7. For a discussion of the legal precedents for development rights transfer, see
Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35 (1974), excerpts reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 27.
8. See, e.g., Costonis, The Chicago Plan Incentive Zoning and the Preservation
of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972), excerpts reprinted in TDR, supra
note 2, at 95; J. COSTONIS & R. DEVoY, THE PUERTO RICAN PLAN: ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHT TRANSFER (1974), excerpts reprinted in
TDR, supra note 2, at 200 [hereinafter cited as PUERTO RICAN PLAN]; Development
Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972) [hereinafter cited as New
York City].
9. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82. See, e.g., Collier County, Fla., Ordi-
nance 82-2 § 9.1(h)(5) (Jan. 5, 1982) which provides for the assignment of one half of
a residential unit per acre of preservation zone land.
10. The rights are treated as an interest in real property and, therefore, must
comply with recording statutes. See, e.g., Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 81-122 §§ 4,
5F (Jan. 1, 1982). The landowner may choose to use the rights himself on the recipient
202 [Vol. 8
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site. This is accomplished by means of a restrictive covenant placed on
the preserved land after its development rights have been sold or used
by the landowner on a recipient site. Title to preserved land may be
retained by its owner or dedicated to the government.11
While the South Florida TDR programs evaluated allow rights to
be purchased and sold directly on the open market,12 more elaborate
schemes exist. For instance, local government may act in an intermedi-
ary capacity for ihe purchase and sale of rights. The landowner, in the
absence of a private purchaser, may sell his rights to the government
which maintains a rights "bank."1" The advantage to the seller is ap-
parent: he has an immediate market for his rights. However, the local
government must then expend funds to purchase those rights. Once the
rights are sold by government, some commentators maintain that the
system operates at no cost to anyone.1 4
Because the property owner is compensated for his inability to de-
velop his property, TDRs have been advocated as an answer to
"wipeout." 15 The landowner is wiped out by the economic loss suffered
when his property is either downzoned16 or frozen in a low zoning clas-
sification. While payment for downzoning is not required in the absence
of a taking,17 TDRs function to ameliorate the harshness of such
regulation.
site or sell them to another, or he may hold them and not utilize them. Thus far, in
South Florida, only Collier and Dade Counties have reported transfers of rights. See
infra text accompanying notes 111-115.
11. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 193.501 (1981) which provides for retention of the
title by its owner.
12. No government rights bank system exists in the six South Florida regions
evaluated.
13. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE
L.J. 75, 87 (1973) [hereinafter cited as An Exploratory Essay]. Cf PuERTO RICAN
PLAN, supra note 8, at 208, 209 (buyer is required to purchase through government
"bank").
14. Shlaes, Who Pays for Transfer of Development Rights?, 40 PLAN., July
1974, at 7-9, reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 330, 336 [hereinafter cited as Shlaes].
But see infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
15. Hagman, Windfalls and Wipeouts in THE GoOD EARTH OF AMERICA, ex-
cerpts reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 265, 273. Windfall and wipeout refer to the
gains and losses in value of real property its owner incurs as a result of government
regulation. For example, a single zoning change could cause appreciation in value in
one parcel (windfall) while causing depreciation in another (wipeout).
16. Downzoning refers to the assignment of a lower zoning classification to a
parcel which acts to further restrict its use and/or density.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 20-24.
1983]
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Successful uses of TDRs produce numerous benefits: vital land is
preserved; the landowner receives compensation for his inability to fur-
ther develop his property; development is directed toward a more desir-
able location;18 and land preservation is accomplished without financial
outlay on the part of government.1 9 While the TDR concept appears
disarmingly simple, the complexity in implementation soon becomes
evident.
III. Constitutional Considerations
A. The Taking Issue: Compensatory Aspects of TDRs
A local government's ability to regulate private property derives
from its constitutionally implied police power. This power is limited in
that any ordinance in which "provisions are clearly arbitrary and un-
reasonable, having no substantial relationship to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare" 20 will be declared unconstitutional.
When regulation so restricts private property as to deprive its owner of
all reasonable beneficial use, a landowner may bring suit in inverse con-
demnation; the court must then determine if a taking has occurred.21
The usual judicial remedy for excessive regulation is to invalidate the
ordinance rather than to compel compensation to the landowner under
the power of eminent domain.2 Courts generally hesitate to extend the
18. See Wilson, Precedent Setting Swap in Vermont, 61 AM. INST. ARCHITECTS
J. 51 (1974), reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 256; Lynch, Controlling the Location
and Timing of Development by the Distribution of Marketable Development Rights
(June, 1973) (unpublished mimeo), reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 259, 260.
19. See supra note 14.
20. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
21. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125,
136 (1978).
Compensation is required if a "taking" has occurred. "[N]or shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No pri-
vate property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation
therefor paid to each owner. . . ." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
The federal "taking" clause is applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution which provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."
22. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The California Supreme
Court had held that a landowner could not sue in inverse condemnation when challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance. In the event the ordinance constitutes a
taking, the California court ruled that the only remedies available are mandamus and
declaratory judgment; damages are not recoverable. Id. at 259, 263. On appeal to the
204 [Vol. 8
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"taking" language of the fifth amendment to include burdensome regu-
lations.2 Instead, excessive restrictions imposed by zoning regulations
have been described by one court as deprivation of property rights
without due process of law,24 a noncompensable violation requiring in-
validation of the enactment.
The argument has been made that it is sometimes necessary for
government to regulate private property by means of harsh zoning en-
actments. 25 For example, government may seek to preserve property by
placing strict limitations on development.2 By granting TDRs to the
landowner in conjunction with harsh use restrictions on his property,
the government body acquires a basis for defending its zoning ordi-
nance against an inverse condemnation challenge.27 According to this
rationale, the landowner is not deprived of all reasonable beneficial use
of his property once TDRs are granted. 8
United States Supreme Court, the Court found that no "taking" had occurred and thus
refused to consider what the appropriate remedy for excessive regulation should be. Id.
at 263.
But see San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981) (inverse condemnation) in which the United States Supreme Court held that
since no final judgment had been entered, the taking issue would not be addressed. Id.
at 630, 633. The San Diego dissent, written by Justice Brennan, argued that a final
judgment had been entered and, further, that a regulatory taking demands that govern-
ment pay just compensation for the period during which the taking occurred. Id. at
646, 647, 653. Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell joined the dissent. Justice Rehn-
quist, in his concurring opinion, stated that if this were an appeal from a final judg-
ment, he would agree with much of what was said in the dissenting opinion. Arguably,
therefore, five of the nine justices believe that just compensation is mandated for a
regulatory taking, but the dissent is not yet the law.
23. See Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587,
593, 594, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384, 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (1976).
24. Id.
25. See generally Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation
Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 1021, (1975) [hereinafter cited as "Fair" Compensation].
26. Noted commentator, John Costonis, has advocated that where government
enacts burdensome zoning regulation, the landowner should receive fair compensation
for his economic injury, a new judicial standard. Id. at 1022. Rather than evaluating
compensation based on the parcel's highest and best use, a traditional assessment made
under eminent domain proceedings, Costonis proposes a standard keyed to a lesser eco-
nomic return. Fair compensation may be paid in "dollars or by some non-dollar but
market worthy alternative." Id. Transferable development rights fulfill the require-
ments for fair compensation. Id.
27. Id. at 1044, 1045, 1051.
28. Id.
1983]
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The New York Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Fred F.
French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York.29 In French, the mort-
gagee of a Manhattan residential complex sued to have a New York
zoning amendment which applied only to his property declared uncon-
stitutional. The resolution rezoned his private parks, which were part of
a residential complex, from a high density residential and office build-
ing classification to a "Special Park District,"3 thus precluding on-site
development. The regulation provided the property owner with TDRs
usable elsewhere in Manhattan but did not identify a specific parcel as
the recipient site. Affirming the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts, the New York Court of Appeals held that the zoning amend-
ment was unconstitutional since "it deprive[d] the owner of all his
property rights, except the bare title." 1 The court chose to invalidate
the ordinance rather than force the city to compensate the land own-
er.3 2 Under the facts of the case, the granting of TDRs was not suffi-
cient to uphold an excessively burdensome zoning ordinance against an
inverse condemnation challenge.
In evaluating the economic injury to the landowner, the court ex-
amined the compensatory aspect of the TDRs granted. Viewing them
as a "potentially valuable ...commodity [which] may not be disre-
garded in determining whether the ordinance has destroyed the eco-
nomic value of the underlying property," 3 the French court said, "in
this case, [they] fall short of achieving a fair allocation of economic
burden.'34 However, in dicta, the court recognized that where a land-
owner is able to sell his interests to an existing rights bank and is paid
"instantly and in money . . . he is paid just compensation for them in
eminent domain."35 In sum, while acknowledging that development
rights are valuable, the French court indicated that they are not the
equivalent of just compensation in the absence of an immediate dollar
29. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
30. Id. at 592, 350 N.E.2d at 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
31. Id. at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
32. The French court regarded excessive regulation as frustration of property
rights without due process of law as opposed to a compensatory taking. Thus, the court
regarded invalidation, rather than just compensation, as the appropriate remedy. Id. at
593, 594, 350 N.E.2d at 384, 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8. Cf. supra note 22 (California
Supreme Court's holding that for a regulatory taking, damages are not recoverable).
33. Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc., 39 N.Y.2d at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 387,
385 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
34. Id. at 600, 350 N.E.2d at 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
35. Id. at 598, 599, 350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
[Vol. 8
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exchange, and could not, therefore, sustain the excessive zoning
regulation.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the concept of trans-
ferable development rights in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City.36 Grand Central Terminal, because of its age and architec-
tural features, had been designated a landmark site under New York
City's Landmark Preservation Law. 7 According to the law, no exterior
structural changes could be made to the building without obtaining the
city's permission. The ordinance also provided that owners of landmark
sites who had not utilized the maximum density permitted under cur-
rent zoning laws were allowed to transfer development rights to speci-
fied parcels. The rights were equivalent to the difference in square feet
between the permitted density, if the site were not a landmark, and the
existing density.38
Penn Central had contracted to construct a multi-story office
building above the terminal, but the city rejected two consecutive plans
for aesthetic reasons and denied permission to build. Penn Central
brought suit against the City of New York, alleging a taking had oc-
curred.3 9 Although Penn Central prevailed in the trial court, that deci-
sion was reversed by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of
Appeals sustained the ruling in favor of the city, firmly rejecting Penn
Central's argument that Grand Central Terminal was not providing a
reasonable economic return. °
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the validity of the
New York Landmark Preservation Law was upheld. The Court deter-
mined that no taking had occurred in view of Penn Central's concession
to the Court that Grand Central Terminal could indeed earn a reasona-
ble return.4 1 This had been the focus of intense litigation in the state
courts. 2 In essence, Penn Central conceded the taking issue. The
36. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
37. New York City adopted its Landmark Preservation Law in 1965. See
N.Y.C. AD. CODE ch. 8-A § 205-1.0 (1976).
38. For example, if the landmark site contains 75,000 square feet of office space
(existing density) and the property, if unrestricted by the landmark law, were zoned for
100,000 square feet, the TDR value would equal 25,000 square feet.
39. Penn. Central Transportation Co., 438 U.S. at 119. Penn Central sought a
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief barring the city from using the Landmark Law,
and damages. Id.
40. Id. at 104, 105.
41. Id. at 129 n.26, 138 n.36.
42. Id.
1983]
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Court, therefore, avoided determining whether transferable develop-
ment rights afforded just compensation under the fifth amendment.
However, the Court did recognize that the rights were valuable, stating
"[w]hile these rights may well not have constituted 'just compensation'
if a 'taking' had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and...
are to be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation. 43
There are few cases subsequent to Penn Central which discuss
TDRs; however, the concept was judicially approved in Florida by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in City of Hollywood v. Hollywood,
Inc. 4 At issue was the validity of a zoning ordinance which contained a
TDR provision. Under the ordinance, a narrow strip of undeveloped
beachfront was zoned for single family density. The western portion of
the land, separated from the beach by a road, was zoned multiple-fam-
ily. The beachfront area had a transfer of development rights proviso
which would have permitted the developer, at his option, to build an
additional 368 condominium units to the west45 in return for dedicating
the beachfront to the city.
The trial court invalidated the ordinance, stating that although the
regulation was nonconfiscatory, it was arbitrary since (1) its density
cap was predicated on an erroneous traffic study and (2) it was unrea-
sonable to assign single-family zoning to beachfront property.4 Fur-
ther, it stated that "the transfer of development rights concept as con-
tained within this ordinance is unsupportable in fact or law."47
The Fourth District reversed the trial court's ruling, citing addi-
tional controlling factors besides the traffic study which were consid-
ered when the ordinance was written. Further, the court found the ap-
plication of the single family zoning classification to the beachfront
43. Id. at 137.
44. 432 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 83-92 where the related issue of density is
discussed.
46. City of Hollywood, 432 So. 2d at 1334.
47. Id. (quoting the trial court). Lack of familiarity with the TDR concept is an
ever present problem. In the instant case, the Fourth District noted that both parties
had failed to cite in their briefs the Florida statute which provides for transfer of devel-
opment rights, FLA. STAT. § 193.501 (1981). See supra note 5. Perhaps the difficulty
arose because the statute appears under "Assessments." The court, in regarding the
absence of the statute from the briefs, commented, this "leaves us nothing short of
mystified." Id. at 1337.
208 [Vol. 8
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parcel to be "compatible [and] fairly debatable, ' 48 i.e., reasonable and
not arbitrary. The court then examined the TDR segment of the ordi-
nance and had "no trouble upholding the particular provision em-
ployed.""' Applying the taking criteria set forth in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City,50 the court stated it had "already
found the government action to be proper and reasonably related to a
valid public purpose." 51 In its assessment of the economic impact of the
ordinance on the developer, the court declared that it could not quarrel
with a gain of 368 multifamily units against the loss of 79 single family
units and upheld the provision. The developer contended that requiring
actual transfer of title to the city "goes too far."52 The Hollywood
court responded that if the developer accepted the transfer proposal,
the court would be "suspicious of any motives for keeping a hold on
[the beachfront]."5 Since the transfer was optional under the terms of
the ordinance, the developer was still free to build the seventy-nine
units permitted on the beachfront property.5 4
The French, Penn Central, and Hollywood decisions suggest that,
in analyzing the effects of a TDR zoning regulation, courts will initially
determine if the regulation is a proper exercise of the police power. The
focus will then shift to remaining beneficial uses which exist on the
restricted property. As long as no taking has occurred, any transferable
development rights granted by the government will be regarded as miti-
gation or amelioration of financial loss. If the regulation has resulted in
a taking, i.e., is held to be excessively restrictive, the courts most com-
monly will invalidate the ordinance. In the alternative, courts may up-
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1337, 1338.
50. Id. at 1338. The three "taking" criteria the court applied were (1) character
of the government action, (2) whether the land use restriction was related to a valid
public purpose, and (3) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant. Id.
(citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
51. City of Hollywood, 432 So. 2d at 1338.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Shortly after this case was decided, the City of Hollywood, although having
won the appeal, announced it would buy the litigated property. Funds were available
from the State of Florida under the "Save Our Coasts" program. Both the transfer site,
i.e., the beachfront, and the recipient site, i.e., the westernmost portion of the land
across the street from the beach, will be acquired. Thus, the Hollywood TDR regula-
tion is rendered moot since it was specifically implemented for this geographical region.
See HOLLYWOOD, FLA., ZONING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. 32A (1978).
2091983]
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hold the regulation but require just compensation.5" These cases sug-
gest that in the event just compensation is mandated and transferable
development rights have been granted to the landowner under the ordi-
nance, courts must assess the present economic value of the TDRs so as
to determine if they constitute just compensation. As the French court
acknowledged, without the ability to immediately market the TDRs
and convert them to dollars, the prospect of judicial recognition of
transferable development rights as just compensation is unlikely. In
conclusion, the granting of TDRs not susceptible to an immediate dol-
lar exchange is not likely to sustain an excessive zoning regulation.
B. The Uniformity Issue: Do TDRs Violate State Zoning Ena-
bling Acts and Equal Protection?
A TDR ordinance requires recipient sites to accommodate the
density transferred from the preservation zone.5 6 According to the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, the act on which state zoning
enabling legislation is based, "all zoning regulations shall be uniform
for each class or kind of building through each district. 57 Allegations
that TDR ordinances violate this uniformity requirement and constitute
spot zoning stem from the fact that some buildings in the recipient
zone will be afforded greater densities than others due to the acquisi-
tion of development rights. Commentators give little weight to this ob-
jection, applying the rationale that all property owners in the receiving
zone have the same opportunity to purchase rights. 8 In the event land-
owners in the recipient zone do not have a reasonable opportunity to
acquire development rights, the TDR ordinance could fall as violative
of the constitutional requirement of equal protection. 9 Since commen-
tators agree that "the statutory requirement of uniformity is simply
duplicative of the constitutional requirement of equal protection," 60
55. See supra notes 22, 32.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
57. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ZONING, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD
STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING
REGULATIONS 2 (rev. ed. 1926), quoted in SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 2, at 158.
58. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 2, at 158, 159. See also Marcus, A Comparative
Look at TDR, Subdivision Exactions, and Zoning as Environmental Panaceas: The
Search for Dr. Jekyll Without Mr. Hyde, 20 URB. L. ANN. 3, 45-48 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as A Comparative Look].
59. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 2, at 158.
60. Id.
[Vol. 8210
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they are treated as "single in nature."61 Therefore, assuming no court
would invalidate TDR ordinances based on equal protection objections,
it is likely that objections based on the uniformity requirement would
also be unsuccessful. Further, the claim that TDRs effectuate spot zon-
ing,62 can, according to one commentator, "be overcome . . . upon a
showing that the special treatment accorded the landowner involved is
reasonably necessary to further the efforts of the municipality in imple-
menting its comprehensive plan." s
IV. Pragmatic Considerations: Problems in Implementing and
Administering South Florida TDR Ordinances
While TDR systems have been advocated for many purposes, it
is beyond the scope of this article to examine all of their applications.
The focus of this section will be limited to the three uses of TDRs in
South Florida: preservation of environmentally sensitive land and open
space, preservation of farmland, and preservation of historic landmark
sites.6 5
61. Id.
62. A Comparative Look, supra note 58, at 52.
63. Id.
64. See generally SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 2 (preservation of historic landmark
sites); TDR, supra note 2 (preserving landmarks, open space and fragile ecological
resources; as a primary system of land use regulation; as a method of encouraging low
and moderate income housing; as a method of regulating location and timing of com-
munity growth); Danels and Magida, Application of Transfer of Development Rights
to Inner City Communities: A Proposed Municipal Land Use Rights Act, 11 URB.
LAW. 124, 129 (1979) (transfer of parking rights, transfer of rights to erect outdoor
advertising, transfer of uses permitted by local zoning ordinances but unexercised,
transfer of various licenses and easements).
65. The six south Florida regulations evaluated provide for the following pur-
poses: Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 81-122 (Jan. 1, 1982) (preservation of environ-
mentally and ecologically sensitive lands, specifically the East Everglades wetlands);
Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance R-81-28-30 (Nov. 23, 1981) (preservation of ag-
ricultural and environmentally sensitive land); Collier County, Fla., Ordinance 82-2 § 9
(Jan. 5, 1982) (preservation of environmentally sensitive lands and historic sites); Pi-
nellas County, Fla., Zoning Reg. § XXXIII-D(l)(d) (Dec. 16, 1980) (preservation of
environmentally sensitive areas and open space); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE art. II,
§ 64.09 (1977) (preservation of environmentally and ecologically sensitive land);
HOLLYWOOD, FLA., ZONING AND LAND DEV. CODE art. 32A (1978) (preservation of
North Beach and West Lake areas, i.e., preservation of environmentally sensitive lands
in these specific locations).
1983]
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A. Identification of Land in the Preservation Zone and Estab-
lishment of Program Goals
The first step in any TDR program is the identification of land for
preservation coupled with the determination of the goals of the pro-
gram. If the land identified for preservation is unimproved, the TDR
ordinance should allow for some margin of development in order to sur-
vive judicial challenge in inverse condemnation actions.6 6 Where land is
already improved so that a reasonable beneficial use is easily estab-
lished, courts will be more apt to sustain the ordinance as
nonconfiscatory.
When the goal of community planners is preservation of historic
landmarks, the regulation necessarily concerns improved property. The
owner usually retains the reasonable beneficial use of his property and
the regulation should survive a taking challenge. From a conceptual
framework, this system is easier to implement than others because it
deals with density values that are certain. Since planners know exactly
how much development would be allowed on the landmark site under
present zoning, they know exactly how much density must be trans-
ferred.68 Moreover, a relatively small number of buildings are involved;
under urban TDR ordinances, development occurs in the same general
area as the preserved site.69 In South Florida, only the Collier County
ordinance provides for the granting of TDRs to owners of historic
landmark sites.7° Thus far, no rights have been transferred for this
purpose.
On the other hand, in South Florida environmental and open space
preservation programs, land is usually undeveloped or marginally devel-
oped. Where no prior development has taken place, a zoning ordinance
which seeks to preserve land by precluding all development on it, thus
leaving its owner with no reasonable beneficial use, is likely to be
66. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35. But see Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972) (limited use of private property to its
"natural use").
67. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43.
68. See supra note 38.
69. E.g., Elliott and Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in Land
Development Controls, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 56, 72-78 (1972). Under the New York
City Landmark Preservation Law, development rights could only be transferred to con-
tiguous sites. The law was later amended to allow transfer to designated non-contigu-
ous lots within a radius of a few blocks. Id. at 72, 73.
70. Collier County, Fla., Ordinance 82-2 § 9.1(a) (Jan. 5, 1982).
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deemed confiscatory. This appears to be true regardless of the issuance
of TDRs to the regulated landowners."1 Therefore, when government's
preservation goals require barring all development on unimproved land,
as opposed to simply placing limits on its development, direct govern-
ment purchase by means of eminent domain actions may prove the bet-
ter way.72 Direct purchase eliminates the risks inherent in enacting ex-
cessively restrictive zoning regulation, namely, the taking challenge
that burdened landowners will surely raise and the possibility that the
regulation will be struck down by the courts, thus opening the way for
undesirable development. Application of a TDR ordinance to unim-
proved property should be limited to situations where development is to
be restricted rather than precluded altogether.
An added consideration is that in South Florida, typically much of
the land designated as environmentally sensitive has poor development
potential. Frequently these areas consist of swamp or mangrove or are
subject to flooding. Often, other environmental restrictions have al-
ready been placed on the land. Implementing a TDR program to pre-
serve land of this kind has met with objection.73 Existing physical con-
ditions and legal restrictions already minimize development in these
areas. Arguably, providing these landowners with TDRs is to accord
them development rights for land with no development potential, a re-
sult contrary to espoused TDR principles. 4 In essence, such landown-
ers are getting something for nothing. Some community planners fear
that developers who bought swampland incapable of development for a
small investment will reap a windfall by exchanging it for valuable de-
71. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35, 55.
72. TDRs and condemnation under the power of eminent domain are by no
means the only preservation techniques available. See generally Netherton, Environ-
mental Conservation and Historic Preservation Through Recorded Land Use Agree-
ments, 14 REAL PROP., PROB. TR. J. 541 (1979) (use of easements, covenants and
equitable servitudes); Marcus, A Comparative Look, supra note 58, at 20, 27 (use of
subdivision exactions, natural area zoning); Carlo and Wright, Transfer of Develop-
ment Rights: A Remedy for Prior Excessive Subdivision, 10 U.C.D.L. REv. 1 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Carlo] (use of downzoning, service moratoria); Making TDR
Work, supra note 2, at 78-80 (use of conventional zoning, density zoning, tax relief);
Markham, Selling Mother Nature, Miami Herald, July 17, 1983, at HI, col. 1 (use of
density and construction techniques to preserve environmentally sensitive area).
73. See A Comparative Look, supra note 58, at 44-45.
74. See, Rose, The Transfer of Development Rights: An Interim Review of an
Evolving Concept, reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 14, 15 [hereinafter cited as An
Interim Review] (Sonoma County, California TDR plan provides that no development
rights are granted to land incapable of supporting development).
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velopment rights. These fears have been realized in Collier County
where mangrove has been exchanged for rights to build residential con-
dominium units." A moratorium on the use of TDRs has been effected
in Collier County so as to allow for analysis of the program.76
An area where TDR ordinances are purportedly more likely to be
successful is in the preservation of agricultural land." Land which is
actively farmed provides its owner with a reasonable beneficial use. By
locking farmland into an agricultural zoning designation and providing
its owner with TDRs, government can accomplish its preservation pur-
pose while compensating the landowner today for loss of speculative
profits. At the same time, the farmer is allowed to continue using his
land productively. Palm Beach County enacted a TDR ordinance pri-
marily for preservation of agricultural land.78 However, to date no
rights have been transferred. Farmland in Palm Beach County is both
expensive and physically capable of supporting development. Where
land possesses both of these attributes, owners have expressed reluc-
tance to relinquish development potential. This is due in part to a lack
of confidence in the continued existence of the TDR system.79 Land-
owners believe that by retaining their rights without using or selling
them, they are retaining the development potential of their farmland.
They maintain that at some later date the zoning law will change, and
development will be permitted to greater intensity.80
Transferable development rights solve few preservation problems.
South Florida planners must be reasonable in their expectations and
realistic in identifying the purposes which such an ordinance might ful-
fill. The physical characteristics of the preservation zone land and its
75. See Spagna, Transfer of Development Rights: The Collier County Experi-
ence, FLA. ENVTL. URB. ISSUES. Jan.-Feb., 1979, at 7, 9 (owner of a 70 acre "mangrove
island" dedicated the island to the county in exchange for rights to build an additional
353 condominium units on other land he owned).
76. Another factor for consideration is that once land in Collier County is desig-
nated as a "special treatment" district, i.e., preservation zone, its tax assessment is
greatly reduced which represents a sizeable tax loss to the county. A Comparative
Look, supra note 58, at 19.
For a detailed discussion of the personal tax consequences of purchase and sale of
rights, see Note, Tax Consequences of Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory
Essay, 33 TAX LAW. 283 (1979).
77. See Richman and Kendig, Transfer Development Rights - A Pragmatic
View, 9 URB. LAW. 571 (1977) [hereinafter cited as A Pragmatic View].
78. Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance R-81-28-30 (Nov. 23, 1981).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 111-115.
80. Id.
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level of development will dictate whether application of a TDR ordi-
nance is practicable. Where land is incapable of supporting develop-
ment, TDRs should not be granted. Where land is physically capable of
supporting development, experience teaches that landowners have not
supported the program; they will not relinquish potential for
development.
B. Calculating Transferable Development Rights, Locating the
Recipient Zone and the Density Issue
Once the preservation area has been identified, the number of
rights which are to be assigned to the landowner must be calculated.
By necessity, potential development rights for urban and rural transfer
or preservation sites are computed differently. In the case of the urban
landmark site, its TDR value is the difference between that density
which presently exists in the landmark structure and the maximum al-
lowed under current zoning if the site were not occupied by a
landmark.81 On the other hand, the formula for determining the TDR
value of a rural site is much more complex since rights are not trans-
ferred in kind, i.e., square feet are not transferred as square feet.82 The
acreage of preservation zone parcels must be converted into dwelling
units or square feet of commercial space transferable to the recipient
site.
The ultimate goal, however, is to effect the transfer of develop-
ment rights without an increase in the overall combined allowable den-
sity of the transfer and recipient zones.83 Thus, a loss of fifty dwelling
units from the transfer site should, in theory, result in an increment of
no more than fifty dwelling units at the recipient site. 4 While the ex-
81. See supra note 38.
82. Several formulas have been proposed: distribution based on the number of
acres of land owned irrespective of value; distribution based on the proportionate value
of the owner's land to the total value of all land preserved; assignment of value "fac-
tors" to land based on proximity to center of development. An Interim Review, supra
note 74, at 4. See also Making TDR Work, supra note 2, at 115, 116 (calculation of
rights based on the difference in value of a parcel with and without development rights;
calculation based on the value of land alone).
83. See An Exploratory Essay, supra note 13, at 88 n.57; Schnidman, Transfer-
able Development Rights: An Idea in Search of Implementation, 11 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 339, 348 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Schnidman].
84. Chavooshian, Norman and Nieswand, Transfer of Development Rights: A
New Concept in Land Use Management, RUTGERS U. Coop. EXTENSION SVCE. (1974),
excerpts reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 173 [hereinafter cited as Chavooshian].
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pressed goal is maintenance of a constant overall density, the effect of
the increased density occurring at the recipient site must be evaluated.
In preservation programs in which density is transferred to moder-
ately developed recipient sites, planning efforts are usually made to ac-
commodate the increased bulk85 and to avoid conferring hardship on
those occupants already in the transfer zone. But, when the recipient
zone is located in a highly developed region such as an urban area,
even small increments in density can strain the existing infrastruc-
ture.8" Ideally, the recipient site for TDRs should be limited to unde-
veloped or moderately developed regions in which planning efforts have
been made to support the increased bulk.17
Planners do not always adhere to espoused TDR principles with
regard to density considerations. Disregard of the constant density goal
is illustrated in application of the City of Hollywood's TDR ordi-
nance."" Under the regulation, an owner-developer was offered the
rights to build 368 additional condominium units on the receiving site
in exchange for the loss of 79 single family units from the beachfront
transfer site.89 The transfer site was located across the street from the
recipient site. The mathematics of this transfer suggest that the num-
ber of rights were calculated on the basis of the owner's economic loss
rather than in an attempt to keep density constant.
Landowners have objected to using a density per acre formula as a
basis for calculating the number of TDRs allocated to the preservation
zone when its real estate is recognized as extremely valuable.90 In an
attempt to overcome this objection, some planners have suggested mar-
But see City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (right to build 79 single family units in preservation zone exchanged for TDRs
to build 368 condominium units at recipient site).
85. Schnidman, supra note 83, at 350.
Often the bulk established by the zoning ordinances for the recipient site is delib-
erately reduced so as to allow for an increase through the TDR mechanism. See
Chavooshian, supra note 84, at 173.
86. New York City, supra note 8, at 365-367.
87. See, e.g., Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance R-81-28-30 § IA(4), 1B
(Nov. 23, 1981) which allows rights to be transferred to specific recipient zones within
the urban service area. But see Dade County, Fla. Ordinance 81-122 § 5(B) (Jan. 1,
1982) which allows rights to be transferred to any portion of unincorporated Dade
County designated for urban development.
88. HOLLYWOOD, FLA., ZONING AND LAND DEv. CODE art. 32A (1978).
89. City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332, 1338 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1983).
90. See Making TDR Work, supra note 2, at 115, 115 n.234, 116.
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ket value as an alternative to density for computing the number of
rights allocated.91 To do so, however, would result in a highly objec-
tionable increase in overall density. As previously stated, if zoning law
dictates that a developer could build one hundred units on his preserva-
tion zone property, under TDR theory, he should be granted rights for
no more than one hundred units. However, the developer argues that
this does not adequately reflect his financial loss if the recipient site is
not as valuable as his transfer site, i.e., his profitability will be less
because of its less desirable location. Therefore, it has been suggested
that a developer in this situation receive an increment in rights above
that density which his preservation zone property could support under
present zoning. The effect is to increase the overall combined density of
the transfer and recipient sites which is an objectionable result. 2
Transferable development right ordinances based on economics de-
serve close public scrutiny. Public acceptance of the TDR concept is
not likely when it promises one thing, constant density, but delivers
another.
C. Valuation of Rights, Marketability, and Administrative
Costs
It is generally recognized that to have a successful TDR program
the rights must be readily marketable.9 3 In times of an uncertain real
estate market and a weak economy, immediate sale of rights is un-
likely. Additionally, recognition of development rights as just compen-
sation is judicially doubtful in the absence of a ready purchaser and/or
a specific transfer site. 4 In response to these problems, it has been sug-
gested that local government administer a rights bank which would
purchase any rights that a preservation zone landowner could not use
himself or sell privately.95 The government would recoup its funds
when such rights were sold to developers in the recipient zone.
Several problems are inherent in this approach. The most signifi-
cant is cost. One of the primary advantages of the TDR concept is that
TDRs allow government to preserve land with no financial outlay.9 6 To
91. Id. at 115, 116.
92. Id. at 115 n.234.
93. Id. at 116. See A Comparative Look, supra note 58, at 11.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
95. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
96. Rose, Psychological, Legal, and Administrative Problems of the Proposal to
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place government in the position of maintaining a bank would divert
funds from other needed areas. Government, too, is subject to the un-
certainties of the real estate market, and the prospect of holding rights
for long periods of time, as well as administering the system, could
prove very costly.
A further consideration in assessing the marketability of develop-
ment rights is the selling price of the rights. The seller, of course,
would like to receive the highest price possible, but does not know how
to assess the value of his rights.97 The buyer, however, knows the limi-
tations of his pocketbook. A buyer-developer selling luxury units with
presumably greater profitability can afford to pay more for a right than
a developer of less expehsive units. Since the seller may not know the
exact location of the recipient site of his rights or the type of develop-
ment the buyer has planned, he is uncertain as to what to ask a pro-
spective purchaser.
Although the difficulty in obtaining a purchaser may be circum-
vented by the use of the government rights bank, ascertaining a fair
price remains problematic. If rights are sold by the government at fixed
prices, developers of luxury units may be reaping large windfalls.
Equating land cost per unit with the cost of a right per unit, it is possi-
ble that the luxury developer may be paying considerably less per unit
for those obtained through the TDR mechanism than he is for his other
units. Although TDRs are advocated as a way around the "windfall-
wipeout" dilemma,98 this arrangement simply shifts the windfall. If
rights are sold at variable prices, the seller may not realize fair com-
pensation for his burdened land and the potential for abuse is present.99
In sum, a rights bank would unquestionably support the TDR system,
but, considering costs and administration, it may be seen as replacing
one set of problems with another. 100 No South Florida TDR program
provides for a rights bank.
D. Rigidity of the System and Potential for Abuse
In order to enjoy support of developers, the TDR system must be
Use the Transfer of Development Rights As a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 6
URBAN LAW 919 (1974), reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 293 [hereinafter cited as
Psychological, Legal, and Administrative Problems]; Shlaes, supra note 14, at 336.
97. See A Comparative Look, supra note 58, at 17.
98. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
99. Id. at 15-17.
100. Id.
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rigid. If the additional density planned for at the recipient site can
readily be obtained by means of a variance or zoning bonus,10 1 the
market for rights will suffer.10 2 Therefore, exceptions to density limits
should be granted only in cases of hardship 0 3 or where planned in con-
junction with the sale of TDRs.0 4 The public tends to look at zoning
ordinances in general and variances in particular with a jaundiced
eye.10 5 Lack of familiarity with the TDR concept feeds the skepticism
which exists,106 but the potential for abuse is present and is not lightly
regarded by the public.107
In Dade County where TDRs have been granted to landowners in
the flood prone East Everglades area, the first sale of rights has been
reported. 0 8 Prior to this sale of rights, the State of Florida, for pur-
poses of preservation, announced its intention to purchase a portion of
the Everglades wetlands.109 This raises the possibility of the State
101. A zoning bonus is an increase in density granted to a developer in exchange
for his providing an amenity such as a plaza or walkway to the building he is
constructing.
102. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 2, at 160.
103. Although "hardship" is recognized as the statutory requirement for grant-
ing a variance, it is frequently ignored. Id. See also Zaldivar and Lowe, Zoning Laws
Like Putty to Developers, City, Miami Herald, May 22, 1983, at Al, col. 1 (hardship
standard ignored in granting variances; politically appointed zoning board overturned
91% of planning department's recommendations that variances be denied).
104. Psychological, Legal, and Administrative Problems, supra note 96, at 298.
105. See supra note 103. See also Zaldivar and Lowe, Miami Zoning: Growing
Without a Plan, Miami Herald, May 22, 1983, at Al, col. 1; May 23, 1983, at A1, col.
1; May 24, 1983, at Al, col. 1; May 25, 1983, at Al, col. 2; May 26, 1983, at Al, col.
2 (five part expose of City of Miami's zoning practices which revealed (1) Zoning
Board and City Commission ignore laws in granting exceptions from zoning restric-
tions, (2) land development industry is largest single source of campaign money for
incumbent city commissioners, (3) variances are routinely granted without regard to
hardship).
106. See Psychological, Legal, and Administrative Problems, supra note 96, at
294, 295.
107. See generally New York City, supra note 8, at 361-367 (attempt to amend
zoning ordinance to permit builders of high rises to exceed bulk limitations by purchas-
ing development rights which would be assigned to old townhouses); Id. at 361 n.124
(attempt by New York to sell air rights belonging to federal government); Meakin v.
Steveland, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 490, 137 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1977) (sale by city of public
street to developers for purpose of allowing developers to use street's air rights to con-
struct additional bulk on their abutting building sites).
108. Rights to Use of Land Are Sold, Miami Herald, Oct. 16, 1983, at H20, col.
3.
109. Id.
1983]
19
Ressler: Transferable Development Rights: An Innovative Concept Faces an U
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Nova Law Journal
purchasing land for which development rights have already been sold,
an occurrence which is purportedly eliminated when a TDR program is
implemented. 10 According to TDR theory, once rights are sold, the
land is sufficiently restricted so that direct government purchase is un-
necessary. Preservation is accomplished without financial outlay on the
part of government. If Florida purchases land for which development
rights have already been sold, Dade County residents will be burdened
twice: one time when the residents must accommodate the increased
density at recipient sites and a second time, when as state taxpayers,
they must pay for the acquisition of the title to the preserved land.
E. Permanency of Zoning Classification: Reason for Success or
Failure?
Traditionally, the right to-develop one's property is integrally re-
lated to the land itself. When one purchases land, he purchases loca-
tion. Conceptually, it is difficult for the landowner to sever development
from its earthly source. Such an abstraction is offensive to many and
explains in part the lack of acceptance of the TDR concept. More sig-
nificant, however, is that according to TDR doctrine, once the land-
owner sells his development rights, he is forever precluded from further
development on that parcel."" Some TDR provisions are more flexible;
rather than preclude development altogether, they severely restrict de-
velopment on the transfer site." 2 Under either circumstance, it is the
element of permanency which prevents many landowners who possess
development rights from selling them.
Landowners lack confidence in the continued existence of the TDR
system. Many believe it will be abolished in the future, and the land-
owner who has not sold his rights can once again develop his property
to greater intensity than presently permitted. Reluctance to give up po-
tential for development has been cited most frequently as the reason for
unwillingness to sell development rights in South Florida." 3
Where, however, the preservation zone consists of land with ques-
tionable development potential, for example, land in the flood prone
East Everglades area of Dade County or mangrove areas of Collier
110. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
111. See An Interim Review, supra note 74, at 9; Carlo, supra note 72, at 3.
112. See, e.g., A Pragmatic View, supra note 77, at 582, 583.
113. This information was obtained in phone conversations with planning officials
in Palm Beach and Pinellas Counties and the City of St. Petersburg.
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County, owners have been more willing to actively participate in the
TDR system."1 4 Presumably, these landowners recognize that the possi-
bility of development is limited at best and are motivated to realize
whatever profit they can as quickly as possible. But where land is capa-
ble of supporting development, as in the case of Palm Beach farmland,
its owners will not part with its potential. 1 5
V. Conclusion
A TDR zoning ordinance is a tool used by local government to
further its land preservation goals. Development rights are granted to
landowners in conjunction with the restrictive zoning regulation im-
posed. The restrictions limit development of the land; the TDRs
granted to the landowner mitigate the economic injury caused by these
restrictions. However, the zoning ordinance is only the preliminary step
in preserving the regulated property. It is not until after the landowner
uses his rights on a recipient site or sells them to another that a restric-
tive covenant is placed on the land. The property may then be viewed
as permanently limited in its development. Therefore, when South Flor-
ida landowners refuse to use or sell their rights, the TDR system is in
jeopardy. Communities may be forced to abandon this alternative for
land preservation.
Drafters of TDR zoning ordinances must allow for some margin of
development on the regulated property to survive a judicial challenge in
inverse condemnation actions. Case law indicates that TDRs are not
the equivalent of just compensation in the absence of an immediate
dollar exchange. Therefore, the granting of TDRs will not be sufficient
to sustain an excessively burdensome regulation against a taking
challenge.
Adherence to TDR principles is essential to realize the goals of the
program and develop public confidence. Calculation of rights based on
market value of preservation zone land, as in the City of Hollywood's
regulation, results in objectionable density increments and violates the
114. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. In Dade County, where
TDRs have been granted to landowners in the flood prone East Everglades area, rights
to portions of 17,280 acres of land have been bought by the mortgagee of the property.
He, in turn, has sold an option to purchase the rights to a major North Dade County
motel operator. Rights to Use of Land Are Sold, Miami Herald, Oct. 16, 1983, at
H20, col. 3.
115. No rights have been transferred in Palm Beach County. Palm Beach
County's TDR ordinance is primarily for preservation of agricultural land.
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goal of constant density. Government purchase of land for which devel-
opment rights have been sold is abusive and should be avoided; the
State of Florida should not purchase land for preservation which is al-
ready restricted by covenant. Transferable development rights should
not be granted to land incapable of supporting development. In South
Florida, transfers of rights have been effected for properties incapable
or marginally capable of supporting development such as mangrove ar-
eas in Collier County and the flood prone East Everglades region in
Dade County. These landowners are reaping a windfall. Where land is
capable of supporting development, planners have seriously overesti-
mated the willingness of property owners to sell their rights; these prop-
erty owners will not relinquish potential for development.
Legal and administrative problems can be overcome; problems in-
herent in changing commercial realities are infinitely more difficult.
The TDR concept in South Florida has experienced a disappointing
past and faces an uncertain future.
R. Barbara Ressler
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